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COCKPIT TECHNOLOGY FOR THE PREVENTION OF GENERAL AVIATION RUNWAY
INCURSIONS
Lawrence J. Prinzel III and Denise R. Jones
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA
General aviation accounted for 74 percent of runway incursions but only 57 percent of the operations during the fouryear period from fiscal year (FY) 2001 through FY2004. Elements of the NASA Runway Incursion Prevention System
were adapted and tested for general aviation aircraft. Sixteen General Aviation pilots, of varying levels of certification
and amount of experience, participated in a piloted simulation study to evaluate the system for prevention of general
aviation runway incursions compared to existing moving map displays. Pilots flew numerous complex, high workload
approaches under varying weather and visibility conditions. A rare-event runway incursion scenario was presented,
unbeknownst to the pilots, which represented a typical runway incursion situation. The results validated the efficacy
and safety need for a runway incursion prevention system for general aviation aircraft.
•
•
•

Introduction
The Problem

Pilots disoriented or lost (12%)
Unfamiliarity w/ ATC procedures (22%)
Unfamiliarity with the airport (19%)

The FAA defines Runway Incursions as, "any
occurrence at an airport involving an aircraft, vehicle,
person or object on the ground that creates a collision
hazard or results in loss of separation with an aircraft
taking off, intending to take off, landing or intending
to land." Runway incursions are a serious aviation
safety hazard, particularly for general aviation
operations. According to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA, 2005), during the four year
period from fiscal year (FY) 2001 through FY 2004,
there were approximately 257 million aircraft
operations and 1,395 runway incursions reported at
United States towered airports – approximately 5.4
runway incursions for every one million operations.
General aviation accounted for 74 percent of these
incursions but only 57 percent of the operations.
Seventy-six percent of the most severe incursions
(114 of 150 incursions) involved at least one general
aviation aircraft.

The Solutions

The Etiologies

These efforts target improved awareness and enhanced
surveillance, but none of these initiatives directly
involve technology solutions for the flight deck. Taken
together, the proposed FAA solutions may still not
provide a comprehensive solution without addressing
the flight deck. The NTSB currently lists the 6 “most
wanted” aviation safety improvements, including “stop
runway incursions/ground collisions of aircraft” and has
specifically recommended that the FAA implement
technology that, “give immediate warnings of probable
collisions/incursions directly to flight crews in the
cockpit” (cf. NTSB, 2000; 2006). The NASA Runway
Incursion Prevention System has been designed to
provide a flight deck solution to the problem of
runway incursions.

These statistics provide a sobering view of the need
for solutions to the problem of runway incursions, in
general, and one with a focus involving the human on
the flight deck. The FAA has voiced its commitment
to reducing the severity, number, and rate of runway
incursions by implementing a combination of
technology, infrastructure, procedural, and training
interventions. These solutions include Airport
Movement Area Safety System (AMASS); Airport
Surface Detection Equipment Model 3 (ASDE-3),
ASDE Model X (ASDE-X) radar; multi-lateration
systems; in-pavement loops; Runway Status Lights;
(RWSL); enhanced controller training; airport surface
operations advisory circulars; improved airport
surface markings; improved education, training and
awareness;
and
revised
pilot/controller
communications phraseology.

Statistics show the causes of these incursions are
principally pilots (62%) followed by air traffic
controllers (35%), meaning that the leading causes of
runway incursions both involve human factors. The
main causal factor (56%) for pilot-related
occurrences was the pilot’s failure to follow an ATC
clearance (Khatwa, 2002). Further, the FAA has
analyzed runway incursion data and has shown the
following correlating factors:
• Weather not a factor (89%)
• Pilots taxiing w/o clearance (62%)
• Landing/ departing w/o clearance (23%)
• Landing on the wrong runways (10%)
• Pilot distractions (17%)
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NASA Runway Incursion Prevention System

Facilities/Equipment

Leveraging on NASA research (e.g., McCann et al.,
1998), RIPS integrates airborne and ground-based
technologies to provide: (1) enhanced surface
situation awareness to prevent blunders and errors
and, (2) runway conflict alerts to prevent runway
incidents if blunders or errors do occur.

The simulation experiment was conducted at NASA
Langley Research Center (LaRC) using the Integration
Flight Deck (IFD) transport category fixed-base highfidelity flight simulator (Figure 1). The IFD, normally
a Boeing 757 cockpit, was adapted for the experiment
to take advantage of its excellent visual, tactile, and
audio capabilities. A six-degree of freedom non-linear
simulation model of the Cessna 206 (C-206) was used
for this experiment. A collimated out-the-window
scene was produced by an Evans and Sutherland ESIG
4530 graphics system providing approximately 200
degrees horizontal by 40 degrees vertical field of view
at 26 pixels per degree.

As presently envisioned, RIPS provides enhanced
situation awareness using the pilot’s head-up display
(HUD), Primary Flight Display (PFD), and an
Electronic Moving Map (EMM) by displaying airport
map information, surface traffic, and graphical
guidance during rollout, turn-off, and taxi. The system
also continuously monitors for potential incursions and
pilot blunders, and if detected, provides aural and
graphical alerts. These alerts are presented visually on
the displays and aurally throughout the cockpit.
Research during both simulation (e.g., Young & Jones,
2001) and flight tests (e.g., Jones, 2001) for
commercial and business aircraft operations have
demonstrated that these technologies can significantly
increase situation awareness and reduce the occurrence
of runway incursions.

An electronic flight bag (EFB) display was used to
present the airport surface map display concepts
described below (Figure 1). This display was
10.4” (26.4 cm) diagonal with a resolution of 1280 x
1024 pixels.
An electronic research display (RD), was installed on
the instrument panel directly in front of the left seat
and control yoke. The RD was composed of two
10.4” (26.4 cm) diagonal liquid crystal displays and
simulated the “Baseline Round Dials” – that is, the
standard set of Cessna-206 aircraft instruments:
airspeed, attitude, altitude, vertical speed, directional
gyro, turn and bank indicator, tachometer, and
Instrument Landing System indicators (Figure 2).

Research Objectives
The greatest incidence of runway incursions is
attributable to general aviation (GA) aircraft
operations; therefore, mitigating the occurrences for
the GA operator could significantly enhance safety.
Because RIPS has demonstrated tremendous potential
for eliminating the causes of runway incursions for
commercial and business aircraft operations, the
research turns naturally toward system efficacy for
GA operations.
The objective of the present
experiment was to evaluate several candidate RIPS
elements, adapted for GA operations, and compare
them to current electronic flight bag (EFB) capability
for prevention of GA runway incursions.
Method

Figure 1. Integration Flight Deck

General Aviation Pilots

Experimental Design

Sixteen GA pilots served as participants in the
experiment with an equal distribution of flying
experience used to represent the Part 91 population:
low-time (< 400 hours) visual flight rules (VFR),
high-time (> 400 hours) VFR, low-time (< 1000
hours) instrument-rated and high-time (> 2000 hours)
instrument-rated.

The experiment was designed as a 4 (display) by 4
(weather) by 6 (task) partially factorial, mixedsubjects design. The between-subject factor was
display and each participant pilot flew 19 approaches
with the one of the four display concepts. On the last
approach, a runway incursion was staged to assess
the utility of the display concept for runway incursion
prevention. The evaluation subject was not expecting
a runway incursion.
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Figure 2. Baseline Instruments
Display Concepts
Four display concepts were evaluated:
(a) Baseline with a Moving Map and Own-ship
(BMO),
(b) BMO + Traffic Display (BMOT),
(c) BMO + audible runway incursion alerting
(BAMO),
(d) BMOT + audible and graphical runway
incursion alerting (BAMOT).
Figure 3 presents an example of the plan-view
surface map with traffic displayed (BMOT).

Figure 4. Plan-View Surface Map with Traffic and
Alerting (BAMOT)

These display concepts were designed to represent a
range of Electronic Flight Bags (EFB) and alerting
applications, typical of GA aircraft. As shown in
Figure 3, “Traffic Display” refers to the graphical
representation of surface traffic on the moving map
display. “Runway incursion alerting” involves the
addition of computer-generated audible and/or
graphical alerting (e.g., “Warning, Traffic Departing
Two Five”) (Figure 4).

When traffic data was provided, it was “broadcast” at
a 1 Hz rate. Own-ship position data was updated at a
20 Hz rate. Positional errors, noise, or uncertainties
were not introduced into these data.
Evaluation Tasks
During the 19 experimental trials, pilots performed 6
approach tasks at the Reno/Tahoe International Airport
(KRNO): (1) 3-nm straight-in approach to Runway
34R with a full-stop landing; (2) 3-nm straight-in to
34R with wave-off initiated at 200 ft Above Field
Level (AFL); (3) 3-nm straight-in approach to 34L,
with sidestep to 34R for a full-stop landing; (4) 3-nm
straight-in to Runway 25 with a full-stop landing; (5)
Circle-to-land on Runway 25; from a Runway 34L
approach and, (6) 9.56-nm straight-in approach with
go-around initiated at 200 ft AFL.
Weather
Four weather conditions were used to create the
experimental scenarios: (1) 3 miles visibility, 1000 ft.
ceiling; (2) 3 miles visibility, 2000 ft. ceiling; (3) 1
mile visibility, 1000 ft ceiling; and (4) 1 mile
visibility, 400 ft. ceiling.
Procedure
Each pilot participated in an extensive briefing and
training session that was designed to mask the
runway incursion focus of the experiment. Pilots

Figure 3. Plan-View Surface Map with Traffic
(BMOT)
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and separation distance to potential conflict. RSM
was developed for NASA by Lockheed Martin.

flew approach tasks designed specifically to set-up
the necessary conditions for presentation of the
runway incursion scenario. The runway incursion
scenario was presented on the last experimental run.
Pilots were not informed of the total number of runs.
Post-run scales (i.e., Situation Awareness Rating
Technique,
NASA-Task Load Index) and
questionnaires were administered.

Results
FAA Runway Incursion Severity Ratings
The FAA performed an independent analysis of the
experimental data, using an FAA runway incursion
severity rating (FAA, 2005), and categorized the
runway incursion incident data from this study.
• Category A – Separation decreases, extreme
action taken to narrowly avoid collision, or
collision occurs;
• Category B – Separation decreases,
significant potential for collision;
• Category C – Separation decreases, ample
time and distance to avoid collision;
• Category D – Little or no chance of collision
but meets definition of runway incursion.

Simulated ATC clearances were given to all traffic to
recreate the ATC communication “party line”
environment for participant pilots. Surface and
airborne traffic were simulated to represent typical
operations at KRNO (Reno).
Runway Incursion Scenario
The scenario began with the C-206 on approach
aligned with Runway 34R, 3 nm from the threshold
at 1010 ft AFL and 90 knots. The weather condition
was day with 1000 ft ceiling and 3 miles visibility.
The incursion traffic started at the Runway 34R hold
line near the Runway 34R threshold. The incursion
traffic then taxied into position on the active runway
while the participant pilot was on final approach
(approximately 2 nm from the threshold). The
incursion is categorized as a pilot deviation (i.e.,
incursion traffic not cleared for departure on 34R).
The runway incursion scenario represents the most
prevalent type of GA runway incursion (i.e., taxiing
onto runways or taxiways without clearance) during
weather conditions when they most often occur (i.e.,
day VMC). This scenario would engender at least a
“category D” severity rating (see below) from the
FAA dependent upon pilot response to the event.

Using these classifications, the 16 “rare event”
runway incursions produced fourteen scenarios in the
less hazardous Category C and D incursions, one
resulted in a Category A incursion, and one resulted
in a Category B incursion (see Table 1). The 14 less
hazardous Category C and D incursions were
mitigated by the EPs by conducting a go-around and
gaining separation from the traffic.
Traffic
awareness was provided by either the display
concepts or visual acquisition out-the-window.
The Category A runway incursion occurred with the
EP flying the BMOT display concept. Despite the
traffic indications on the surface map and out-thewindow visuals, the EP demonstrated no awareness of
the runway traffic, over-flew the traffic and landed.

Runway Incursion Alerting
The Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) incursion
detection algorithm (Green, 2006) was used to
generate the alerting function for the BAMO and
BAMOT display concepts. The RSM monitors
traffic that enters a three-dimensional virtual
protection zone around the runway that is being used
by the own-ship. Incursion detection is based on the
operational state of the own-ship and traffic, as well
as other criteria (separation and closure rate).
Identification, position, and altitude data is used to
track the traffic in the protection zone. Traffic data
projections are calculated within RSM since, from
flight test experience, reliable position updates are
not received at consistent intervals. RSM generates a
warning alert, which occurs when a runway incursion
is detected and evasive action is required to avoid a
potential collision. Information provided with each
alert includes identification of the incurring traffic

The Category B incident occurred when the EP overflew the runway traffic (at 146 ft AFL) before
conducting a go-around. The EP was aware of the
incursion after having received an audible alert
(BAMO display concept) but continued to descend to
visually acquire the traffic to confirm the alert. This
incident would have been classified as a Category D
incursion if the EP had initiated the go-around at first
awareness of the alert.
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Table 1. Results Categorized by the FAA Runway
Incursion Severity Ratings
Pilot
#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6
#7
#8
#9
#10
#11
#12
#13
#14
#15
#16

Display
BMO
BMOT
BAMO
BAMOT
BMO
BMOT
BAMO
BAMOT
BMO
BMOT
BAMO
BAMOT
BMO
BMOT
BAMO
BAMOT

Mental Workload and Situation Awareness
After the incursion scenario, no statistical differences
were found for overall mental workload or situation
awareness,
p>.05,
between
the
display
configurations.
Subjectively, the EPs gave
significantly better ratings for audible alerting
displays for runway incursion detection, F (3,15)
=17.955, p<.05; likelihood of runway incursion
prevention in real-world, F (3,15) = 10.948, p<.05;
and level of perceived safety, F(3,15) = 8.814, p<.05.

Rating
D
CB+
D
D
D
D
C
C
A
D
C
D+
D+
D
D

Pilot Preference
For those displays that had alerting (BAMO,
BAMOT), there were no significant differences in
timeliness of the alerting in terms of being able to
take evasive action. However, when pilots were
asked to rate all four display concepts on the
perceived efficacy of the alerts (F (3,15) = 10.948,
p<.05) and the additional safety value added (F(3,15)
= 8.814, p<.05) analyses revealed significant effects
between the displays. Subsequent post-hoc Student
Newman Keuls tests showed that pilots reported that
the BMO display condition was significantly poorer
than the other three display conditions, which were
not significantly different from each other.

Runway Incursion Detection Reaction Time
As shown in Figure 5, the incursion traffic was
typically acquired sooner when the EP was provided
with a traffic display on the surface map and/or
incursion alerts, but the differences were not
statistically significant at the = 0.05 level.

Conclusions

No statistically significant differences were found
between the display concepts for the distance to the
incurring traffic when the pilots initiated a go-around
or for the EP’s reaction time from the incursion event
occurrence (based on a Multivariate Analysis of
Variance (MANOVA) test p > 0.05).
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The addition of audible alerting was found to
enhance runway incursion detection. Furthermore,
had the experiment simulated the alerting system also
being installed on the incursion aircraft, it is less
likely that situation would have become a runway
incursion event (i.e., category “D”); since the
incursion aircraft would have received an alert before
taxing onto the active runway.
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The experimental objective was to determine how
different EFB and alerting concepts supported pilot
situation awareness and resolution of runway
incursions.
The results show large individual
differences in response to an incursion event regardless
of display concept. However, only one pilot’s
performance was judged as a severe runway incursion
risk for collision (with the BMOT display). Despite
having traffic on the display and other cues, the pilot
was unaware of the traffic and landed just beyond the
incursion aircraft, resulting in a near-miss.

The results generally match past research on
commercial and business aircraft operations - the
incursion alerts provided sufficient time and
awareness to avoid a potential incursion conflict.
Post-run briefings revealed that a surface map with

Figure 5. Initial Traffic Awareness
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own-ship and traffic along with audible alerts was
considered an optimal incursion prevention display
for GA aircraft, while an audible alert alone was
considered a minimally effective display. Over half
of the pilots evaluated would have liked maneuver
guidance for conflict resolution in conjunction with
incursion alerting. In general, the pilots reported
feeling substantially safer during runway incursion
incidents with onboard alerting.
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There is tremendous potential to significantly
enhance safety for all classes of aircraft by using
flight deck awareness and alerting for runway
incursion prevention, such as that demonstrated
herein using the NASA Runway Incursion Prevention
System. Future research will further refine the
system concepts with targeted enhancements toward
support of GA operations.
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